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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
“A DECENT RESPECT TO THE OPINIONS OF 
[HUMAN]KIND”: THE VALUE OF A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
JULY 30, 2010 
RUTH BADER GINSBURG 
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
The invitation to greet members of this Congress was irresistible, 
for it revived memories of my own participation in earlier meetings 
of the International Academy of Comparative Law. In the 1960s, I 
attended Congresses in Hamburg, Uppsala, and — most delightfully 
— Pescara, in Abruzzi. The value of comparative studies was 
brought home to me at those gatherings, which — along with my 
affiliation with the Columbia Law School Project on International 
Procedure, my membership in the American Foreign Law 
Association, and my 1964–1972 service on the Board of Editors of 
the American Journal of Comparative Law — powerfully influenced 
my work as a lawyer, law teacher, and now judge. 
As David Clark’s fine articles in 2006 and 2007 issues of the 
American Journal of Comparative Law relate, renowned jurists in the 
United States were leading participants in the formative years of the 
Academy. Among the bright minds engaged in the 1930s were 
Professors Roscoe Pound, John Henry Wigmore, Samuel Williston, 
and Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone. And at the only other 
international congress of comparative law held in the United States, 
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in St. Louis in 1904, Supreme Court Justice David Brewer served as 
congress president. 
From the birth of the United States as a nation, foreign and 
international law influenced legal reasoning and judicial 
decisionmaking. Founding fathers, most notably, Alexander 
Hamilton and John Adams, were familiar with leading international 
law treatises, the law merchant, and English constitutional law. And 
they used that learning as advocates in legal contests. 
The U. S. Constitution, in Article I, authorized Congress to define 
and punish “Offences against the Law of Nations,” and the very first 
Congress passed the Alien Tort Act, which empowers federal courts 
to entertain civil actions brought by an alien for a tort “committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 
Any doubt about the tradition of judicial reference to foreign and 
international law was (or should have been) laid to rest by a 
comprehensive article composed by Steven G. Calabresi and 
Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, published in 2005 in the William & 
Mary Law Review. The survey, running over 160 pages, shows how 
very wrong it is to charge that citing foreign law is a recent heresy 
advanced by liberal activist judges in pursuit of their political 
preferences. 
The law of nations, Chief Justice Marshall famously said in 1815, 
is part of the law of our land. Decisions of the courts of other 
countries, Marshall explained, show how the law of nations is 
understood elsewhere, and will be considered in determining the rule 
which is to prevail here. Those decisions, he clarified, while not 
binding authority for U. S. courts, merit respectful attention for their 
potential persuasive value. 
Decades later, in 1900, the U. S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that  
“[i]nternational law is part of our law and must be ascertained and 
administered by [our] courts of justice . . . . [W]here there is no 
treaty, no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, 
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, 
and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, 
who by years of labor, research and experience, have made 
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subject of which they 
treat.” 
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Those works today, include the writings of many in this audience. 
Flash forward with me now to the hearings held earlier this month 
on the nomination of Elena Kagan for a seat on the U. S. Supreme 
Court. Queries about international and foreign law were several 
times posed by members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 
One Senator expressed “dismay” that, during Kagan’s tenure as Dean 
of the Harvard Law School, “first year students [were required] to 
take a course in international law.” Another ventured that “[n]owhere 
did the founders say anything about using foreign law.” “[P]lease 
explain,” that Senator asked, “why it is OK sometimes to use foreign 
law to interpret our Constitution or statutes, our treaties.” Yet another 
asked “whether [judges should] ever look to foreign laws for good 
ideas” or “get inspiration for their decisions from foreign law.” 
Nominee Kagan responded: “I’m in favor of good ideas . . . 
wherever you can get them.” “Having an awareness of what other 
nations are doing might be useful,” she explained, offering as an 
example a brief she filed as Solicitor General a few months ago in a 
case concerning the immunity of foreign officials. Of course, she 
observed, on a point of U. S. law, foreign decisions do not rank as 
precedent, but they could be informative in much the same way as 
one might gain knowledge or insight from reading a law review 
article. “I’m troubled,” a Senator told her, that she “believes we can 
turn to foreign law to get good ideas.” 
Contrast with those exchanges, the view of the Constitution’s 
framers, expressed in The Federalist, on the “high importance” to the 
new nation of our adherence to “the laws of nations” in our 
commerce with other countries. The authors of The Federalist, 
schooled in history, looked abroad for both positive and negative 
examples to guide their course. 
On judicial review for constitutionality, my own view is simply 
this: If U.S. experience and decisions may be instructive to systems 
that have more recently instituted or invigorated judicial review for 
constitutionality, so too can we learn from others now engaged in 
measuring ordinary laws and executive actions against fundamental 
instruments of government and charters securing basic rights. 
Exposing laws to judicial review for constitutionality was once 
uncommon outside the United States. But particularly in the years 
following World War II, many nations installed constitutional review 
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by courts as one safeguard against oppressive government and 
stirred-up majorities. National, multinational, and international 
human rights charters and courts today play a prominent part in our 
world. The U.S. judicial system will be the poorer, I have urged, if 
we do not both share our experience with, and learn from, legal 
systems with values and a commitment to democracy similar to our 
own. 
In the value I place on comparative dialogue — on sharing with 
and learning from others — as I earlier noted, I draw on counsel 
from the founders of the United States. The drafters and signers of 
the Declaration of Independence showed their concern about the 
opinions of other peoples; they placed before the world the reasons 
why the States, joining together to become the United States of 
America, were impelled to separate from Great Britain. The 
Declarants stated their reasons out of “a decent Respect to the 
Opinions of Mankind.” They sought to expose those reasons to the 
scrutiny of “a candid world.” 
The U.S. Supreme Court, early on, expressed a complementary 
view: The judicial power of the United States, the Court said in 1816, 
includes cases “in the correct adjudication of which foreign nations 
are deeply interested . . . [and] in which the principles of the law and 
comity of nations often form an essential inquiry.” Just as the 
founding generation showed concern for how adjudication in our 
courts would affect other countries’ regard for the United States, so 
today, even more than when the United States was a new nation, 
judgments rendered in the USA are subject to the scrutiny of “a 
candid World.” 
True, there are generations-old and still persistent discordant 
views on concern about, and recourse to, the “Opinions of Mankind.” 
As my quotations from the remarks of Senators at the Elena Kagan 
hearings indicate, U. S. jurists and political actors today divide 
sharply on the propriety of looking beyond our nation’s borders, 
particularly on matters touching fundamental human rights. 
Expressing spirited opposition, my dear colleague, Justice Antonin 
Scalia, for example, counsels: The Court “should cease putting forth 
foreigners’ views as part of the reasoned basis of its decisions. To 
invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore 
it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.” 
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Another trenchant critic, Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals 
Judge Richard Posner, commented not long ago: “To cite foreign law 
as authority is to flirt with the discredited . . . idea of a universal 
natural law; or to suppose fantastically that the world’s judges 
constitute a single, elite community of wisdom and conscience.” 
Judge Posner’s view rests, in part, on the concern that U.S. judges do 
not comprehend the social, historical, political, and institutional 
background from which foreign opinions emerge. Nor do most of us 
even understand the language in which laws and judgments, outside 
the common law realm, are written. 
Judge Posner is right, of course, to this extent: Foreign opinions, 
as Elena Kagan reiterated in her responses to Senators, are not 
authoritative; they set no binding precedent for the U.S. judge. But 
they can add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution of 
trying questions. Yes, we should approach foreign legal materials 
with sensitivity to our differences and imperfect understanding, but 
imperfection, I believe, should not lead us to abandon the effort to 
learn what we can from the experience and wisdom foreign sources 
may convey. 
Comparative sideglances can sometimes aid us in deciding not 
only what we should do, but what we should not do. A notable 
example: In the “Steel Seizure Case” decided by the U. S. Supreme 
Court in 1952, Justice Jackson, in his separate opinion, pointed to 
features of the Weimar Constitution in Germany that allowed Adolf 
Hitler to assume dictatorial powers. Even in wartime, Jackson 
concluded, the U.S. President could not seize private property (in 
that case, the steel mills). Such a measure, in good times and bad, the 
Court held, required congressional authorization. 
At the time Justice Jackson cast a comparative sideglance at 
Weimar Germany, the United States itself was a source of “negative 
authority” abroad. The Attorney General pressed that point in an 
amicus brief for the United States filed in Brown v. Board of 
Education, the public schools desegregation case decided in 1954. 
Urging the Court to put an end to the “separate but equal doctrine,” 
the Attorney General wrote: 
”The existence of discrimination against minority groups in the 
United States has an adverse effect upon our relations with other 
countries. Racial discrimination . . . raises doubts even among 
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friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic 
faith.” 
Judges in the United States, after all, are free to consult all manner 
of commentary — Restatements, Treatises, what law professors or 
even law students write copiously in law reviews, and, in the internet 
age, any number of legal blogs. If we can consult those sources, why 
not the analysis of a question similar to the one we confront 
contained, for example, in an opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the German 
Constitutional Court, or the European Court of Human Rights? 
Henry Fielding wrote in one of his novels that examples work 
more forcibly on the mind than precepts. With that counsel in mind, I 
will endeavor, now, to recount briefly some recent Supreme Court 
decisions involving foreign or international legal sources as an aid to 
the resolution of constitutional questions. In a headline 2002 
decision, Atkins v. Virginia, a six-member majority (all save the 
Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas) held unconstitutional 
the execution of a mentally retarded offender. The Court noted that 
“within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for 
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly 
disapproved.” 
The next year, the Court looked beyond our borders in a case titled 
Lawrence v. Texas. Overruling a 1986 decision, the judgment in 
Lawrence declared unconstitutional a Texas statute that prohibited 
two adult persons of the same sex from engaging, voluntarily, in 
intimate sexual conduct. 
On respect for “the Opinions of [Human]kind,” the Lawrence 
Court emphasized: “The right the petitioners seek in this case has 
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other 
countries.” In support, the Court cited a leading 1981 European 
Court of Human Rights decision, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, and 
subsequent European Human Rights Court rulings affirming the 
protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, 
consensual conduct. 
The current U. S. Supreme Court has several times shown “a 
decent respect for the opinions of humankind” in cases arising out of 
the war on terror. In June 2008, for example, the Court held, in 
Boumediene v. Bush, that Congress acted unconstitutionally when it 
2011] THE OPINIONS OF [HUMAN]KIND 933 
eliminated federal court jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas 
corpus filed by aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay. The Guantanamo 
prison, the Court’s opinion made plain, may not be treated by the 
President or Congress as a legal black hole. Prisoners there have the 
right, protected by Article I of the Constitution, the Court ruled, to 
challenge the legality of their detention before the nation’s courts. 
The Court had established the groundwork for Boumediene in a 
2006 decision, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. There, the Court held that the 
President, acting without congressional authorization, could not 
order trial of Guantanamo Bay detainees by military commissions. 
Even in “our most challenging and uncertain moments” when “our 
Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested,” Justice 
O’Connor wrote for the four-Justice plurality in Hamdan, “we must 
preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we 
fight abroad.” “[H]istory and common sense,” she reminded, “teach 
us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to 
become a means for oppression and abuse.” 
Two University of Chicago Law School professors (Eric A. Posner 
and Adrian Vermeule) promptly published their disagreement with 
Justice O’Connor’s statement and a similar speech made by Lord 
Hoffman, acting as a Law Lord in the first Belmarsh Prison case; 
indeed, the professor called the O’Connor-Hoffman remarks 
“absurdities.” People do not prefer liberty to death, they urged. A 
government that does not contract civil liberties in face of terrorist 
threats, they said, “is pathologically rigid, not enlightened.” Yet what 
greater defeat could we suffer than to come to resemble the forces we 
oppose in their disrespect for human dignity? 
I will conclude these illustrations with the Court’s March 2005 
decision in Roper v. Simmons. Holding unconstitutional the 
execution of persons under the age of 18 who committed capital 
crimes, the Court acknowledged “the overwhelming weight of 
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty.” Justice 
Kennedy wrote for the Court that the opinion of the world 
community provides “respected and significant confirmation of our 
own conclusions.” “It does not lessen our fidelity to the [U. S.] 
Constitution,” he explained, to recognize “the express affirmation of 
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples.” 
Recognizing that forecasts are risky, I nonetheless believe the 
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U. S. Supreme Court will continue to accord “a decent Respect to the 
Opinions of [Human]kind” as a matter of comity and in a spirit of 
humility. Comity, because projects vital to our well being — 
combating international terrorism is a prime example — require trust 
and cooperation of nations the world over. And humility because, in 
Justice O’Connor’s words: “Other legal systems continue to 
innovate, to experiment, and to find . . . solutions to the new legal 
problems that arise each day, [solutions] from which we can learn 
and benefit.” 
My best wishes to all in this assemblage. May you continue to 
listen to, and learn from, each other. 
 
